28 Introduction/Background. In August 2017, a cholera outbreak started in Muna Garage IDPs camp, Borno 29 State-Nigeria, and >5000 cases occurred in six local government areas. This qualitative study evaluated 30 perspectives about the emergency response to this outbreak.
19
"We were notified through the routine surveillance system, as we saw an increase in the number of 20 cases of cholera. The moment we saw reports stating cases were coming out from IDP camps, we decided not to 21 take chances" (FGD, Dr. Adesola Yinka-Ogunleye, Epidemiologist and NCDC Cholera Technical Working 22 Group Lead, Abuja).
23 In surveillance, the word 'alert' portrays emergency and urgency to respond, but the word "notify" was used 24 more frequently. What is mentioned above as routine surveillance refers to IDSR strategy [10] , which was not 25 directly mentioned during interviews. Furthermore, the Expanded Program on Immunization Team learnt about 26 the outbreak while they were on vacation.
27
"The cholera outbreak notification came in when we were on short break. We had to shorten our break 28 and returned immediately to respond to the outbreak. Before our return, non-immunization activities had 29 already been on ground, like WASH, active case search, and case management" (KI, Dr. Oche James, Focal 30 Person for Supplementary Immunization Activity, Maiduguri).
31 Meanwhile at the WHO Country Office level, the disease was identified through the weekly epidemiological 32 reports of EWARS.
33
"The moment the Office was notified through EWARS, it contacted the government (NCDC and BMOH) 34 to make sure they declare it as quickly as possible" (KII, Dr. Alemu Wondimagegnehu, WHO Country Office, 35 Abuja).
36 Some partners specifically mentioned EWARS and phone platform surveillance systems, which are appropriate 37 for reporting emergency that requires an immediate response. However, the IDSR strategy, although intended 38 for early detection and rapid response to outbreaks with epidemic potential, was not mentioned. Other partners 39 such as ALIMA and FHI360 were notified during a joint health sector meeting held at EOC.
40 Outbreak confirmation and declaration. Very critical to the outbreak response was outbreak laboratory 41 confirmation by culture and declaration. As such, the call on August 16, 2017 prompted an immediate visit by 42 WHO Surveillance Team to MSF Dalaram Clinic ( Fig 1B) to ascertain the case. Despite timely visit, collection 43 of samples at bed side, and a positive Rapid Diagnostic Test (RDT), the confirmation was delayed.
12 69 "We also had to take into cognizance the political situation and repercussions of declaring an outbreak. 70 We are in democracy. Somebody will just think that you are trying to score political points by declaring cholera 71 outbreak. We had to be convinced and then convince the government to see reason to declare an outbreak" 72 (KII, Dr. Ghuluze).
73 Yet, as the outbreak started on August 16th, was confirmed on the 26th, and officially declared on August 28th
74 (12 days after), several partners stated that outbreak declaration was delayed. The following excerpts sum up 75 partners' perspectives of outbreak declaration.
76
"…Although it was a difficult task, but with much persuasion, clinical prove, and consultation, the state 07 In contrast, the WHO-led surveillance team investigated and traced the first suspected case back to the 08 household in Muna Garage IDPs camp ( Fig 1B) . The team found that sewage leakage from one of the latrines 09 was flowing to the index case's household.
10 "When we went to the index case's house, we saw sewage that was leaking into his house and we 11 notified the WASH sector" (KII, Dr. Uzoma Ugochukwu, WHO Surveillance Unit; Maiduguri).
12 They also found that almost all children in the index case's household had cholera, which led to active case 13 search in and outside the camp. 21 Within a week cholera spread to the whole camp and host communities. Some key factors that may have led to 22 the sporadic spread of the disease were delayed declaration and festive period of 'Eid El Jabir, and the delayed 23 establishment of the CTC at Muna Garage IDPs camp ( Fig 1B) .
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"The time lag between the period of waiting for culture confirmation … created room for the wide 25 spread of the disease" (KII, Dr. Uzoma Ugochukwu, WHO Surveillance Assistant Team Lead).
"Immediately after Eid EL Jabir, cases were reported in other
LGAs. Realizing the potential of Eid El Jabir in 27 the spread the outbreak, awareness was raised in response, but restrictions on population movement could not 28 be undertaken", Dr. Uzoma supplemented.
29 Echoing Dr. Uzoma, Dr. Okudo asserted,
30
"The outbreak spread rapidly, because there was this festival with lots of eating and celebration and 31 after which there was a jump in the number of cases. So we knew we had a full blown outbreak" (Dr. Okudo 32 Ifeanyi, WHO Acting TL&WCL, Abuja).
33 Eid El Jabir, a Muslim religious festival that entails lots of movement and food sharing and that coincided with 34 the outbreak, may have amplified the outbreak. Furthermore, though the outbreak started in Muna Garage IDPs 35 Camp of Jere LGA, the first CTC was set up in Dalaram Clinic in Maiduguri LGA ( Fig 1B) . 40 patients were referred from Muna Garage to Dataram Clinic using ambulances, which exposed anyone in the 41 ambulance to the disease. It was when the number of cases was going up and an advocacy made to the 91 groups, and leadership, which WASH couldn't initially identify. The introduction of the locals gave us a lot of 92 feedback as to why there was reluctance to use chlorine. It was discovered that there was misconception about 93 chlorination. Some were afraid that chlorine was for sterilization, which would stop women from giving birth if 94 they use the chlorinated water. There was also this misconception that chlorinated latrines produce chlorine 95 vapor and when women use them the vapor will sterilize and stop them from giving birth," Mr. Kabuka Banda 96 continued. 97 We note here that the technical people did not use the phrase 'sterilize water', which the community could have 98 mistakenly thought to mean sterilize for fertility. What was actually rumored in the community was,
99
"You see that whitish think that they are putting in water, houses and latrines, it will stop women from 00 giving birth to children" (KII, Dr. Gerida Birukila, UNICEF-C4D, Maiduguri).
01
The identification of the community structure uncovered these misconceptions and so the question then become 02 who amongst these strata do the people trust to talk about promoting chlorine and personal hygiene?
03
"Working with C4D, the WASH team mobilized more than 430 people within the community who then 04 became more effective in transmitting campaign messages and eventual chlorine acceptance. In other words, in 05 order to have a successful intervention, it all boils down to who are involve" (Mr. Kabuka Banda emphasized).
06 Key among the people that were mobilized in the community were 'Bullemas', community leaders and gate 33
The call for UNICEF to support the federal ministry signals that more collaboration is needed between 34 government and partners in WASH. This need for collaborative support is clear when one looks at the WASH 35 conditions in the camps prior to the outbreak as documented by various sources. Collaboration is also needed 36 between federal and state water ministries given that the former played no role in the outbreak response.
37
The following were challenges encountered by the WASH teams: 1) misconception about chlorine (it was 38 associated with sterilization) led to avoidance of chlorinated water and latrines, 2) at peak season electricity 19 39 from solar panels was not enough to provide water into the communal thanks, so people turned to street 57 In camps where the three facilities were operated by three different partners, issues of competition arose as 58 summed up in the excerpt of one of the partners.
59
"The only challenge we can clearly point out was the unnecessary competition amongst partners over 60 who takes the glory?"(FGDs, FHI360, Maiduguri).
61 This competition manifested in many ways including case referrals as exemplified. 98 The 2017 Abuja preparedness workshop laid the foundation for OCV use in Nigeria. One of the 99 recommendations from the workshop was the approval of OCV in Nigeria, which NCDC applied and obtained 00 the approval from the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration. Thus, the August 2017 Borno 01 outbreak gave opportunity to use the newly approved intervention, and in so doing turned endemic 02 consideration quickly into reactive (emergency) use with initial focus in Muna Garage IDP Camp ( Fig 1B) . Key 03 to the deployment of OCV was the existing robust polio vaccination structure: 90 For an effective response, the coordination team needed to overcome not only hurdles in budget allocation 91 between partner and government, but also hesitancy in team formation. Some partners were reluctant to be part 92 of the team. Other issues affecting coordination at the start of the response included some partners not coming 93 in through a single identified channel, competing demands between insecurity and health emergencies, and the 94 lack of synergy between the WASH and health sectors.
95
"WASH was doing its own activities and so was WHO," Dr. Lawi asserted.
96 The mention of WASH above refers to UNICEF. As the outbreak ranged on, the need to overcome coordination 97 difficulties became dire. In this respect, the completion of the EOC by WHO and handing it over to the BMOH 98 just at the onset of the outbreak could not have happened at a better time.
99
"The greatest success in overcoming coordination hurdles was the EOC, which was used as the 00 planning and response center for all partners. The second factor in coordination break through was the State 01 identification of the key thematic areas and populating these with key people in teams of between 5 and 7 02 members," Dr. Lawi continued.
03 NCDC agrees, emphasizing the role of EOC in coordination break through.
04
"In a bid to respond to the outbreak, our main focus was to work with the state and partners to 05 coordinate response. It was about that period that the EOC was setup by WHO and just commenced operations 48 setting up CTCs [31] , training staff for their hygienic use, patient flow in CTCs, mapping inventory to prevent 49 stock outs, and maintaining OCV could chain, the logistics team ensured the right products or services in the 50 right numbers at the right place for the right price and at the right time [35] . Some challenges to the logistics 51 team included some partners averse to releasing stock availability during inventory mapping and inability to 52 source Ringer's lactate locally. The limited polio infrastructure storage capacity led to trans-docking of OCV in
